Prudence, Power, and Principle in U.S. Foreign Policy - Mackubin Owens
Monday, June 20, 2022
Political scientists and international security specialists routinely employ two dominant paradigms to examine foreign relations: “realism,” which focuses on the relative power of states in the international system; and “liberal internationalism,” which stresses the role of cooperation, norms, and international institutions in the international system.
Realists argue that states are driven by interest: power and security. In a system of “international anarchy,” states face a security dilemma that leads to arms racing, offensive and defensive alliances, with war always a possibility. For realists, the international system is conflictual. In contrast, liberal internationalists argue that the international system is potentially cooperative. Diplomacy can trump force.
Unfortunately for both parties, this sterile debate has never been able to fully explain U.S. foreign policy. Of course, the United States has pursued its interests in the international arena. But an important U.S. interest has long been the maintenance of a liberal international order, which seeks to maximize liberal principles such as liberty, free trade, and prosperity.
GET THE LATEST BREAKING NEWS HERE -- SIGN UP FOR GOLOCAL FREE DAILY EBLASTSince the end of the Cold War, Democratic administrations have usually adhered to liberal internationalism, indeed going so far as to attempt to create a “global good,” a corporatist globalism divorced from American patriotism or national greatness. On the other hand, the George W. Bush Administration pursued a form of realism, albeit in the interest of a liberal internationalist goal: to spread democracy and reshape the world in a liberal image. That hubristic quest foundered on the shoals of tribalism and religion in Afghanistan and Iraq.
I have argued that the United States has been most successful when it has adhered to a foreign policy of “prudent American realism” linking American principles with prudence, which, as Aristotle argued, is the virtue most characteristic of the statesman, requiring as it does the ability to choose the best means for achieving good ends.
Prudent American realism differs from the realism taught as part of academic international relations courses. Prudent American realism has always fused the features of traditional realism—power and security—with prosperity and the preservation of American principles.
Like liberal internationalism, prudent American realism recognizes that the internal character of regimes matters and that our foreign policy must reflect the fundamental principles of democratic republicanism. But unlike liberal internationalism, which holds that international law and institutions alone are sufficient to achieve peace, prudent American realism understands that there are certain problems that can be addressed only through the prudent exercise of power.
In addition to fusing principle and prudence, prudent American realism stresses several operational concepts. First, it distinguishes between friends and allies, on the one hand, and enemies and adversaries, on the other. Second, prudent American realism stresses forward defense, forward presence, and freedom of navigation. Its geostrategic goal is to maintain the traditional U.S. maritime alliance along what Nicholas Spykman called the “rimlands” of Eurasia, designed to keep a potential Eurasian hegemon contained.
Third, prudent American realism recognizes that the internal character of regimes matters for U.S. foreign policy, a principle that also can be found in Thucydides, who noted that an important goal of both Athens and Sparta was to establish and support regimes similar to their own, democracies in the case of Athens and oligarchies for Sparta. The inference one can draw is that the security of a state is enhanced when it is surrounded by others that share its principles and interests.
But although the internal character of regimes matters, prudent American realism also very much recognizes the need to limit our aspirations when it comes to “spreading democracy” abroad. Again, “prudence” is the operative term here. For one thing, “democracy” is not always liberal democracy. For another, our resources are finite, and good strategy requires the United States to prioritize among the goals it wishes to accomplish. Finally, as Afghanistan illustrated, the character of any given people does not always make them a good candidate for democracy.
Fourth, prudent American realism recognizes the classical connection between force and diplomacy. For too long, American policy makers, motivated by the assumptions of liberal internationalism, have acted as if diplomacy alone is sufficient to achieve our foreign policy goals. But as Frederick the Great once observed, “Diplomacy without force is like music without instruments.” Prudent American realism recognizes that diplomacy and force are two sides of the same coin.
Finally, prudent American realism does not hesitate to use economic power as an instrument of foreign policy. Finance, trade, technology, and energy are powerful means of leveraging national power.
The foreign policy of the Reagan Administration, which brought down the Soviet Empire, was a species of prudent American realism. It successfully linked principle and power in a way consistent with the existing realities of the international arena.
It is interesting to note that given the almost universal condemnation of the Trump Administration’s foreign policy by the U.S. “national security community,” Trump’s approach most closely adhered to prudent American realism. His approach was simple: he understood the purpose of American power to advance the interests of American citizens.
Accordingly, the Trump administration adopted a state-centric view of international politics, one that approached international institutions and “global governance” with great skepticism. Trump refused to cede sovereignty to international institutions in order to be embraced by the mythical “international community.” His approach recognized that although it was in the interest of the United States to cooperate with others within this international system, such cooperation depends on reciprocity.
The Trump administration embraced armed diplomacy. American policymakers have long treated force and diplomacy as an either/or proposition. But understood properly, force and diplomacy are two sides of the same coin. The threat of force increases the leverage of diplomats.
Finally, Trump’s foreign policy advanced a defense of liberal principles. The United States is safer and more prosperous in a world populated by other democratic republics, yet prudence dictates that the attempt to spread our principles must be both strategic and cost-effective.
Trump’s version of prudent American realism was ultimately based on the principle that the end or purpose of American power is—or should be—to secure the American Republic, protect its liberty, and facilitate the prosperity of its people, not on behalf of some mythical “global good.” Indeed, Trump’s election in 2016 was due in part to the perception on the part of the American electorate that U.S. power was not being used to advance the interests of Americans but rather to serve others, i.e., the “international community,” international institutions, or the like.
In both the short and long term, a foreign policy of prudent American realism is the best hope for assuring the freedom, security, and prosperity of the United States. This is the best approach for enhancing American power, influence, and credibility.
Mackubin Owens is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He previously served as editor of Orbis: FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs (2008-2020). From 2015 until March of 2018, he was Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. From 1987 until 2014, he was Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.
He is also a Marine Corps veteran of Vietnam, where as an infantry platoon and company commander in 1968-1969, he was wounded twice and awarded the Silver Star medal. He retired from the Marine Corps Reserve as a Colonel in 1994.
Owens is the author of the FPRI monograph Abraham Lincoln: Leadership and Democratic Statesmanship in Wartime (2009) and US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain (Continuum Press, January 2011) and coauthor of US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: The Rise of an Incidental Superpower (Georgetown University Press, spring 2015). He is also completing a book on the theory and practice of US civil-military relations for Lynne-Rienner. He was co-editor of the textbook, Strategy and Force Planning, for which he also wrote several chapters, including “The Political Economy of National Security,” “Thinking About Strategy,” and “The Logic of Strategy and Force Planning.”
Owens’s articles on national security issues and American politics have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, International Security, Orbis, Joint Force Quarterly, The Public Interest, The Weekly Standard, The Washington Examiner, Defence Analysis, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Marine Corps Gazette, Comparative Strategy, National Review, The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor; The Los Angeles Times, the Jerusalem Post, The Washington Times, and The New York Post. And, he formerly wrote for the Providence Journal.
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